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Premium Subsidies, the Mandate, and Medicaid Expansion:  
Coverage Effects of the Affordable Care Act 
 
Abstract: Using premium subsidies for private coverage, an individual mandate, and Medicaid 
expansion, the Affordable Care Act (ACA) has increased insurance coverage. We provide the 
first comprehensive assessment of these provisions’ effects, using the 2012-2015 American 
Community Survey and a triple-difference estimation strategy that exploits variation by income, 
geography, and time. Overall, our model explains 60% of the coverage gains in 2014-2015. We 
find that coverage was moderately responsive to price subsidies, with larger gains in state-based 
insurance exchanges than the federal exchange. The individual mandate’s exemptions and 
penalties had little impact on coverage rates. The law increased Medicaid among individuals 
gaining eligibility under the ACA and among previously-eligible populations (“woodwork 
effect”) even in non-expansion states, with no resulting reductions in private insurance. Overall, 
exchange premium subsidies produced 40% of the coverage gains explained by our ACA policy 
measures, and Medicaid the other 60%, of which 1/2 occurred among previously-eligible 
individuals. 
 
Keywords: Health Insurance, Medicaid, Tax Credits, Individual Mandate 
JEL Codes: H51, I11, I13 
 
  
  3 
One of the most significant policy issues facing the United States over the past forty 
years has been the high number of those without health insurance. The percentage of uninsured 
Americans rose steadily from the 1980s through 2010, through both recessions and economic 
growth (DeNavas-Walt, Proctor, & Smith, 2013). A major policy focus during this era was 
intervening in insurance markets to expand coverage and offset this trend. This mostly happened 
using public insurance via Medicaid and the Children’s Health Insurance Program, with little 
private sector intervention (Gruber & Levitt, 2000). This pattern of incremental public coverage 
expansion changed dramatically with the passage of the Affordable Care Act (ACA) in 2010.  
The ACA enacted enormous expansions of both public and private insurance. The former 
was to take place through a nationwide expansion of Medicaid to all those with incomes below 
138% of the Federal Poverty Level (FPL); however, the Supreme Court ruled in 2012 that states 
could refuse this expansion. The private insurance expansion takes place through sizeable 
income-based tax credits for those with incomes from 100-400% of FPL who are not eligible for 
Medicaid, to subsidize premiums for private insurance purchased on newly established insurance 
exchanges. Underlying the expansion are new insurance regulations that end discrimination on 
the basis of pre-existing conditions, coupled with an individual mandate that requires most 
Americans to obtain insurance (with several exemptions, most notably related to affordability). 
These principal pieces of the ACA took effect in January 2014.1 
National data from multiple sources strongly support the notion that the ACA has 
reduced the uninsurance rate substantially beginning in 2014, reaching an historic low by 2015 
(Cohen & Martinez, 2014; Smith & Medalia, 2015; Sommers, Gunja, Finegold, & Musco, 2015). 
This drop has generally been attributed to the ACA, but most analyses of the ACA to date have 
 
1 The earliest coverage expansion enacted under the ACA was the dependent coverage provision, which mandated that private insurers allow 
parents to cover their children on their insurance until age 26. This provision took effect September 2010. We do not examine this policy here, 
since it had essentially reached steady-state by 2012 and has already been examined thoroughly elsewhere (Antwi, Moriya, & Simon, 2013). 
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been largely descriptive (Cohen & Martinez, 2014; Long et al., 2014) or limited to a particular 
aspect of the ACA such as the Medicaid expansion (Black & Cohen, 2015; Kaestner, Garrett, 
Gangopadhyaya, & Fleming, 2015; Wherry & Miller, 2016). No studies have disentangled the 
different coverage effects of the ACA’s various provisions. Even as the 2016 election results cast 
uncertainty over the ACA’s future, these issues remain critically important to understanding the 
potential impact of a partial or complete rollback of the law, as well as the potential 
consequences of future state or federal efforts to expand coverage. 
In this paper, we provide the first comprehensive model that identifies the causal impact 
of the ACA’s numerous provisions on insurance coverage. In doing so, we also offer an 
empirical template for future research on this wide-ranging law. We use data from the American 
Community Survey (ACS) for the two years before and two years after full ACA 
implementation. We estimate rich models that examine both the public coverage expansions and 
private coverage subsidies that are put in place by the ACA, as well as the individual mandate. 
Public insurance expansions are identified by state decisions about whether to take up the 
Medicaid expansions and by differential impacts of Medicaid expansions across income groups 
and family types. Private insurance subsidies are identified by the variation in effective subsidy 
rates by income group and area of the country. Mandate effects are identified by variation in the 
incidence of the penalty (related to the law’s several mandate exemptions) and the magnitude of 
the penalty (tied to income and family structure). Our models allow us to control for fixed 
differences and trends by income group and geographic area. 
Overall, we find that our policy parameterization can explain roughly 60% of the increase 
in insurance coverage from 2012-2013 to 2014-2015.   The remaining 40% of coverage gains in 
2016 does not appear to be mediated by the economic recovery, based on prior research by 
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Blumberg, Garrett, and Holohan.  A reasonable interpretation is therefore that as much as 40% of 
the ACA’s coverage gains could be attributable to the combined effects of increased insurance 
purchase rates related to the new marketplace, increased value of coverage based on the law’s 
essential benefits, community rating, and a generalized effect of the mandate not tied to its 
specific exemptions and penalty amounts.  Any one of these policies in isolation could, in theory, 
be contributing up to 40% of the overall ACA effect, though more likely each is contributing a 
portion.  Unfortunately, given the simultaneous implementation of these policy provisions, it is 
impossible to disentangle each of these components.”. 
Within these ACA coverage changes, we have several key findings. The impact of tax 
credits to private insurance was fairly modest but grew over time, with each 10% increase in 
subsidy reducing the uninsured rate by roughly 0.5 percentage points in 2014 and 0.9 percentage 
points in 2015. Premium tax credits produced much larger effects in states operating state-based 
insurance exchanges, as opposed to using the federal exchange (healthcare.gov), suggesting 
potential benefits to local implementation of the law. All told, exchange insurance subsidies 
accounted for approximately 40% of the reduction in the uninsured rate attributable to our ACA 
policy parameters. In contrast, the mandate penalty had a negligible impact on coverage.  
Meanwhile, Medicaid accounted for the other 60% coverage change attributable to our 
ACA policy measures, via three distinct pathways. Medicaid expansion increased coverage 
among newly-eligible individuals by roughly 14 percentage points in 2015, which accounted for 
nearly 20% of the observed ACA effect on the uninsured rate. Another 10% came from the 
ACA’s early expansions of Medicaid that occurred in 6 states between 2011-2013. Nearly 30% 
of the ACA policy impact on coverage in 2014-2015 came via the less discussed “woodwork 
effect” of increased insurance enrollment among those who were previously eligible for 
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Medicaid before the ACA but not enrolled. This phenomenon was evident in all states, whether 
or not they had expanded Medicaid, and occurred for both adults and children. Finally, we find 
no evidence that the expansion of Medicaid led to offsetting reductions in private insurance. 
Our paper proceeds as follows. Section I describes the ACA’s main coverage provisions. 
Section II reviews the existing literature on how these policies may impact health insurance 
coverage. Section III describes our data and policy variables. Section IV presents our empirical 
strategy. Section V presents our results. Section VI discusses policy implications and concludes. 
 
I. Background on the Affordable Care Act 
The ACA represents the largest transformation of the U.S. health care system since the 
introduction of Medicare and Medicaid in the mid-1960s. While the legislation also addressed 
issues such as health care costs and quality of care, we focus on the coverage provisions of the 
ACA. There are three key provisions that form the law’s “three legged stool”:  
The first is a federal overhaul of private insurance market regulation. Among other 
changes, the ACA guarantees the issue of insurance regardless of pre-existing conditions, bans 
medical underwriting, and eliminates annual or lifetime benefit limits. These provisions apply to 
the entire non-group insurance market, as well as to non-self-insured employers. 
The second is the individual mandate. Under the ACA, legal residents of the U.S. are 
mandated to obtain insurance, subject to a number of exemptions, and those who do not are 
subject to a tax penalty. This penalty was modest in 2014, equal to the larger of $95 or 1% of 
income; it has grown more sizeable since, rising to the larger of $695 or 2.5% of income in 2016. 
Exemptions exist for those with incomes below the threshold for filing federal income taxes, 
low-income residents in states that have not expanded Medicaid under the ACA, and those who 
cannot find insurance on the exchange for less than 8% of income. 
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The third is comprised of policies to make health insurance more affordable. This 
includes a massive expansion of public insurance through a universal extension of Medicaid 
eligibility to all those below 138% of the federal poverty level.2 Medicaid was previously 
categorically restricted: some groups (such as children and pregnant women) were typically 
eligible above this income level, others (such as disabled adults and low-income parents) were 
only eligible at much lower income levels, and the remaining low-income adults (so-called 
“childless adults”) were not eligible at all in most states. This expansion had differential impacts 
by state, income, and family type. An additional element of variation in Medicaid eligibility was 
the result of a Supreme Court decision in 2012, which made the ACA’s Medicaid expansions 
voluntary. As a result, only 24 states plus Washington D.C. expanded by January 2014; since 
then, another 7 states have expanded (Kaiser, 2015). 
The other source of financial support for insurance was through the introduction of new 
tax credits for private insurance purchased through the exchanges. Individuals are eligible for tax 
credits if they are ineligible for Medicaid and have incomes between 100% and 400% of FPL. 
These credits cap the share of income that individuals must pay for coverage (at the “silver” level 
described below) at between 2% and 9.5% of income on a sliding scale basis. In addition, the 
ACA provides cost-sharing subsidies to enrollees with incomes below 250% of FPL. 
The ACA included other provisions that are harder to quantify, but which might have 
significant effects. The first is the introduction of private insurance exchanges, which brought 
organized shopping to a fractured non-group insurance market. On these exchanges, individuals 
can compare options at four different “metal” levels based on the plans’ actuarial value (the 
share of expected medical costs covered): 60% for bronze, 70% for silver, 80% for gold, and 
 
2 The statutory cutoff for Medicaid eligibility under the ACA is 133% of FPL, but requires that states disregard a portion of applicants’ income 
equal to an additional 5% of FPL, producing an effective eligibility threshold of 138% of FPL. Also, note that Medicaid coverage is not available 
to individuals without either U.S. citizenship or legal permanent residency status for at least 5 years. 
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90% for platinum. States had the option of establishing their own exchanges or using the federal 
exchange; 13 states plus Washington D.C. operated state-based exchanges in 2014-2015, though 
two states (Kentucky and Hawaii) have since reverted to the federal exchange.  
The ACA includes an “employer mandate” as well. This is a charge levied on firms based 
on the share of their employees that are not offered affordable coverage who end up receiving 
exchange tax credits. However, this provision was delayed until 2015, and given the lack of 
information on employer offers of coverage in the ACS, we did not model that policy directly. 
  
II. Literature Review 
Our paper focuses on three main policy levers: public expansions, private insurance 
subsidies, and an individual mandate. In this section we review the literature on the effects of 
these policies on health insurance coverage and what is known to date about the ACA’s effects. 
Previous research on public insurance expansions focuses on the sizeable expansions of 
Medicaid and the Children’s Health Insurance program (CHIP) over the late 1980s-early 1990s, 
and again in the late 1990s-early 2000s (Gruber & Simon, 2008; Sommers, Kronick, et al., 
2012). The literature finds that take-up of these Medicaid and CHIP expansions was moderate, 
with roughly 25-35% of those who became newly-eligible for public insurance coverage 
choosing to enroll. One reason is that many of those made eligible for public insurance already 
had private insurance coverage. Complex application processes and informational barriers also 
contribute to low participation (Sommers, Tomasi, Swartz, & Epstein, 2012).  
Some individuals, however, may have dropped their private coverage for free or heavily 
subsidized public insurance, a phenomenon known as “crowd out” (Cutler & Gruber, 1996). 
Estimates of the share enrolling in public insurance who would otherwise have private insurance 
vary. Some studies have found rates ranging from 20-60% (Gruber & Simon, 2008; Lo Sasso & 
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Buchmueller, 2004), while others have found little to no crowd-out (Hamersma & Kim, 2013; 
Thorpe & Florence, 1998). In general, crowd-out has been found to be greater among expansions 
to higher-income groups (Kronick & Gilmer, 2002). 
There has been much less work on the impact of private insurance subsidies. One well-
cited study (Marquis & Long, 1995) used geographic variation in the price of individual 
insurance to assess the correlation with insurance coverage, estimating an elasticity of demand of 
-0.4. This is problematic, however, since other factors correlated with insurance demand may 
drive this price variation. There has been more work on tax policy and the demand for employer-
sponsored insurance; see Gruber (2005) for a review. Massachusetts’ 2006 health reform law, 
which featured premium subsidies and a state exchange, led to large reductions in the uninsured 
rate (Long, Stockley, & Yemane, 2009). However, the state law’s other features (including 
individual and employer mandates) complicate the interpretation of these findings, and previous 
research has not disentangled the effects of subsidies versus these other provisions. 
There is also less understanding of how the individual mandate impacts coverage and 
interacts with the ACA’s other provisions. Again, the best evidence comes from Massachusetts, 
which introduced an individual mandate as part of its 2006 health reform. In addition to a general 
decline in the uninsured rate, prior research shows several spillover effects of the mandate. First, 
individuals who were already eligible for the state’s Medicaid program but not yet enrolled 
significantly increased their take-up (Sonier, Boudreaux, & Blewett, 2013). Second, despite 
generous non-employer insurance subsidies and a weak employer mandate, there was no erosion 
of employer-sponsored coverage – and some evidence that such coverage increased (Kolstad & 
Kowalski, 2012). This may reflect a response to the individual mandate, in which workers accept 
lower wages in return for employer coverage (Hackmann, Kolstad, & Kowalski, 2015). 
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In terms of the ACA itself, a growing body of research has begun to document changes in 
coverage under the law. Several states opted to expand Medicaid under the ACA prior to 2014, 
and studies indicate small marginal changes in coverage with variable crowd-out – little among 
those with health problems, but significant among younger adults (Sommers, Kenney, & Epstein, 
2014). For the 2014 expansion, federal survey data (Cohen & Martinez, 2014; Smith & Medalia, 
2015) and private data sources (Shartzer, Long, Karpman, Kenney, & Zuckerman, 2015; 
Sommers, Gunja, et al., 2015) all confirm a large drop in the uninsured rate, particularly among 
lower-income adults. A time-series analysis estimated nearly equal coverage gains in 2014 due to 
exchange insurance and Medicaid (Carman, Eibner, & Paddock, 2015), though this study simply 
presented descriptive trends. Finally, several analyses describe moderate coverage gains in 2014 
due to the Medicaid expansion (Courtemanche, Marton, Ukert, Yelowitz, & Zapata, 2016; 
Kaestner et al., 2015). To our knowledge, no research has yet developed an identification 
strategy to assess the ACA’s coverage provisions simultaneously and disentangle their effects.3 
  
III. Data and Policy Measurement 
A. Data 
Our primary source of data for this analysis is the 2012-2015 American Community 
Survey (ACS),. The ACS, conducted by the United States Census Bureau, is the largest 
household survey in the country, with approximately 3 million individuals surveyed in the 
public-use file each year. Within-state geographical information is available in the ACS based on 
approximately 2350 “public use microdata areas” (PUMAs). PUMAs are mutually exclusive 
areas within states that are populated with at least 100,000 individuals; PUMA boundaries were 
 
3 Another strand of research examines effects of public insurance on labor supply, with conflicting findings (Baicker, Finkelstein, Song, & 
Taubman, 2014; Garthwaite, Gross, & Notowidigdo, 2014). Early evidence on the ACA suggests that labor market effects have been minimal 
(Garrett & Kaestner, 2015; Gooptu, Moriya, Simon, & Sommers, 2016; Moriya, Selden, & Simon, 2016), and we do not focus on this issue here. 
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redrawn after 2011 using the Decennial Census, which precludes us from using data prior to 
2012. The ACS is one of the primary sources used by the federal government to evaluate health 
insurance coverage (Finegold & Gunja, 2014; Smith & Medalia, 2015).  
Our study sample includes all non-elderly (age under 65) individuals residing in the U.S., 
other than in Massachusetts. We exclude the elderly from our analysis because the ACA’s 
coverage expansions did not apply to individuals 65 and over. We excluded Massachusetts 
because the state’s 2006 health reform law already included many ACA-like features; our results 
are essentially unchanged by this exclusion.  
Our dependent variables of interest in the ACS are four measures of insurance coverage: 
no health insurance (uninsured), Medicaid, employer-sponsored insurance (ESI, including 
military and union coverage), and non-group private insurance. Together, these four categories 
are inclusive of 98% of non-elderly individuals in the survey, with the remainder insured by the 
VA or Medicare. Regarding Medicaid, the ACS’s question asks about “Medicaid, Medical 
Assistance, or any kind of government-assistance plan for those with low incomes or a 
disability.” Thus, some respondents may answer “yes” to this question based on their receipt of 
government subsidized exchange coverage, while others may report this as non-group coverage 
(i.e. “Insurance purchased directly from an insurance company”).4  
B. Policy Measures 
The ACA marks an enormous policy change towards insurance coverage. Fortunately for 
research purposes, many of the changes embodied in the law vary substantially across 
individuals in a way that can be parameterized. Other factors are more uniform and difficult to 
separate from non-ACA conditions that may more generally impact insurance coverage. 
 
4 The ACS, while generally quite reliable at assessing health insurance coverage and used by the Census in its annual reports on insurance of 
the U.S. population, does produce overestimates of non-group coverage compared to other data sources (Mach & O'Hara, 2011). However, our 
study design effectively subtracts out any time-invariant over-reporting bias for this form of coverage in the survey. 
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Medicaid Eligibility. Our first policy measure is eligibility for Medicaid, which we 
combine with eligibility for the related Children’s Health Insurance Program (CHIP). We 
decompose eligibility into three parts: eligibility prior to the ACA’s Medicaid expansion (i.e., 
using 2010 income thresholds and criteria), eligibility under the so-called “early expansions” that 
occurred under the ACA between 2011-2013 in 6 states;5 and new eligibility as a result of the 
2014 Medicaid expansion. The first group is known as the “woodwork” (or “welcome mat”) 
population that may newly take up Medicaid coverage due to increased awareness of coverage 
options under the ACA, the law’s attempt to reduce administrative-related barriers to applying 
that have previously reduced enrollment (Aizer, 2007), and the individual mandate (Sommers & 
Epstein, 2011). In addition, the existence of Medicaid expansion may increase participation in 
this group as individuals know they are less likely to lose eligibility for small changes in income.  
Our approach distinguishes between these categories of Medicaid eligibility because all 
three may have plausibly experienced coverage changes as a result of the ACA, but likely with 
heterogeneous take-up rates. Most analyses of Medicaid expansions prior to the ACA have 
ignored any potential woodwork effect, which in many cases was likely negligible given the lack 
of other systemic policy changes (such as the ACA’s mandate and application streamlining). 
However, some analyses have identified similar spillover effects in previous expansions (Aizer 
& Grogger, 2003; Sonier et al., 2013). All measures of Medicaid eligibility are constructed using 
state rules based on age, income, disability, and parental status obtained from the Centers for 
Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) and the Kaiser Family Foundation.6  
 
5 The early expansion states are CA, CT, DC, MN, NJ, and WA. See Sommers, Arntson, et al. (2013) for expansion details and timing. 
6 Medicaid and CHIP eligibility for children, parents, and childless adults was obtained for each state, as of 2013, from a pre-ACA survey of 
all 50 states conducted by the Kaiser Family Foundation (Heberlein, Brooks, Aiker, Artiga, & Stephens, 2013), supplemented by information on 
the six states adopting the ACA’s early-expansion option to expand prior to 2014 (Meng, Cabezas, Roby, Pourat, & Kominski, 2012; Sommers, 
Arntson, Kenney, & Epstein, 2013). Information on disability-related eligibility is also from Kaiser (Kaiser, 2010); adult disability was identified 
in the ACS using their disability recode variable. 2014 eligibility was updated with information from CMS (2014). The ACS does not report 
pregnancy, so we do not attempt to model that pathway of eligibility here. We apply the ACA’s statutory 5% income disregard to all MAGI-
eligible groups (groups who income is totaled using the notion of Modified Gross Adjusted Income).  
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Figure 1 depicts the percent of the sample eligible for Medicaid/CHIP, based on state 
expansion status for children (Panel A) and adults (Panel B). All children under the poverty line 
are eligible, regardless of state expansion decision. In the 200-300% FPL range, coverage is 
typically via CHIP and eligibility trails off – more steeply in non-expansion states (which have 
traditionally been less generous with coverage). For adults, expansion states offer eligibility to 
everyone with incomes up to 138% of FPL, while a minority of adults in non-expansion states 
meet both income and categorical criteria for eligibility. Even prior to the ACA expansion, 
eligibility standards for adults were more generous in expansion states than non-expansion states.  
Exchange Premium Subsidies. Our second policy measure is the subsidy rate for 
insurance purchased through the ACA’s exchanges. Since exchange premiums are defined based 
on the family unit, our analysis models the premiums and subsidies using the notion of the health 
insurance unit (HIU) – defined as an adult, his/her spouse, and their dependent children in the 
household, excluding unrelated roommates or other adult relatives (such as grandparents). This 
corresponds to the family unit upon which premium subsidies and Medicaid eligibility is based, 
and we use the term “family” and HIU interchangeably below. 
To construct the subsidy measure, we first calculate an unsubsidized premium for each 
HIU based on the ACA rating area they resided in. We directly matched premiums to individuals 
in cases where a single rating area mapped directly to a PUMA and used population-weighted 
premium averages in cases where multiple rating areas spanned a single PUMA. The HIU 
unsubsidized premium is the sum of the individual premiums for each of its members, with no 
more than three covered children included in the sum based on federal regulations. Individual 
premiums are based on the second-lowest-cost silver plan in the rating area, obtained from the 
Robert Wood Johnson Foundation. We use this plan for two reasons: 1) the silver tier is the most 
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commonly purchased tier, selected by 65% of consumers in the first open enrollment period 
(ASPE, 2014); and 2) the second-lowest cost silver plan is the one to which the ACA’s premium 
tax credits are pegged. All unsubsidized premiums are age-adjusted using state-specific age-rated 
premium curves obtained from CMS. 
Then, we calculate the net subsidized premium for each family. Families with incomes 
outside of 100-400% of FPL and those eligible for Medicaid or CHIP are ineligible for subsidies. 
For the remainder of the sample, net premiums are calculated based on the ACA’s subsidy 
schedule, which determines premium payments on a sliding scale percentage of income.7 In 
addition to net premiums, we also calculate each HIU’s Percent Subsidy, equal to 1 – (Net 
Premium / Unsubsidized Premium). While both are measures of premium subsidy generosity, 
they have important differences. The net premium only captures cost, while the percent subsidy 
incorporates both the cost of coverage and its effective value to the consumer; holding net 
premiums constant, the percent subsidy is higher for older adults and those living in areas with 
more expensive health insurance. A priori, we hypothesize consumers respond to both the cost 
and value of coverage. Thus, percent subsidy is our preferred parameter, but we test both and 
allow the data to indicate which is a better predictor of behavior.8  
Figure 2 shows the percent subsidy as a function of FPL and Medicaid expansion status. 
In non-expansion states, premium subsidies are available starting at 100% of FPL; in expansion 
 
7 Premium tax credits are pegged to the following thresholds: 2% of income for individuals with incomes up to 133% of FPL; 3-4% of income 
for individuals with incomes between 133-150% of FPL; 4.0-6.3% of income for individuals with incomes between 150-200% of FPL; 6.3-8.05% 
of income for individuals with incomes between 200-250% of FPL; 8.05-9.5% of income for individuals with incomes between 250-300% of 
FPL; and 9.5% of income for individuals with incomes between 350-400% of FPL. 
8 Yet a third measure of premium subsidy is also possible, taking into account the ACA’s cost-sharing reductions (CSR) for individuals with 
incomes from 100-250% FPL who are eligible for exchange subsidies. In an alternative analysis, we created a premium subsidy measure that 
takes this into account by inflating the value of coverage (the unsubsidized premium) based on the CSR’s legislative increase in actuarial value. 
Silver plans have an actuarial value of 70%, but the CSR increases this to 94% for those with incomes 100-150% FPL, 87% for incomes 150-
200% FPL, and 73% for incomes 200-250% FPL. The resulting measure therefore reflects a higher percent subsidy for those who would receive 
CSRs, and is equal to our original premium-based measure for those ineligible to receive CSRs. Overall, the CSR’s increase the mean subsidy 
rate from 16% to 17%, and the results of the model using this variable are quite similar to our primary specification. 
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states, where such families are eligible for Medicaid, subsidies begin at 138% of FPL.9 Subsidy 
rates peak at about two-thirds for non-expansion states for those between 100-138% of FPL, and 
slightly over half for those just above 138% of FPL in expansion states. The subsidy rate then 
declines steadily but not quite linearly until going to zero above 400% of FPL. Overall, the 
variation in premium subsidies is a result of two factors – unsubsidized premiums and the ACA’s 
income-based subsidy rules. While the former may vary across markets based on potentially 
endogenous factors including health care costs, PUMA fixed effects should address this concern, 
and it is only in combination with the ACA’s tax credit schedule – which is plausibly exogenous 
– that we obtain variation used to identify the policy impact of the subsidies.10 
Mandate. Our third policy measure is the tax penalty associated with the individual 
mandate. Fundamentally, the existence of the mandate is a time series change that cannot be 
separately identified in our model. To the extent that the mandate creates a generalized “taste for 
compliance” (Saltzman, Eibner, & Enthoven, 2015), our model is unable to capture that effect. 
However, in principle, the mandate does not impact those who are exempted, and due to non-
linearities in the mandate penalty, families may be exposed to different levels of tax penalties for 
forgoing health insurance. We therefore construct a measure representing each family’s tax 
penalty in dollars due to the mandate. The penalty is equal to $0 for families exempt due to any 
of the following (with the percentage of the sample affected by each exemption in 2014 listed in 
parentheses): 1) family income below the federal tax-filing threshold11 (20.7%); 2) family 
income below 138% of FPL in a state that elected not to expand Medicaid (5.5%); 3) Native 
 
9 Legal permanent residents are not eligible for Medicaid until after a five-year waiting period, but premium tax credits are available under the 
ACA for those with incomes under 138%. The ACS does not enable us to distinguish between legal and undocumented immigrants, though it 
does self-reported citizenship. We test the robustness of our results by excluding non-citizens from our sample, and the results are quite similar.  
10 Another important component of the ACA is community rating of premiums. The main effect of community rating is difficult to capture as 
it is essentially a time series effect. One could compute the “effective” subsidy to include the implicit subsidy of community rating, but since we 
do not observe health status, we can’t include implicit subsidization of the sick in such a calculation. But we do include the implicit subsidies 
from compressed age rating, since our existing subsidy variable is largest within a given income band for the most expensive (i.e. oldest) group.  
11 In 2014, the tax-filing thresholds were $10,150 for single non-elderly individuals; $20,300 for married couples filing jointly; and $13,050 
for ‘heads of household’ (i.e., multi-individual HIUs without a married couple). 
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Americans (0.6%); or 4) no affordable coverage available, defined as the lowest-cost option 
having a premium greater than 8% of family income (10.2%).12 For the roughly 64% of our 
sample subject to the mandate, the family-level mandate penalty is calculated per ACA criteria: 
the greater of $95 per uninsured adult (half that per child) or 1% of taxable income in 2014, and 
$325 per adult or 2% of taxable income in 2015.13  
Figure 3 shows the average mandate penalty per family in 2015, by income and Medicaid 
expansion status, while Appendix Figure 1 depicts the percentage of families subject to any 
mandate penalty. No one below 138% of FPL in non-expansion states is subject to the mandate, 
while in expansion states, the mandate takes effect at the tax-filing threshold. Between 138% and 
400% of FPL, most families are subject to the mandate, with the penalty increasing with income. 
Near and above the 400% FPL subsidy cutoff, a substantial portion of families are exempt based 
on the affordability criterion. At higher incomes, most families are subject to the mandate and 
the average penalty approaches $1500 per family.  
 
IV. Empirical Strategy 
Our overall empirical strategy consists of a longitudinal design that uses geographical and 
income-based variation in the ACA policy levers to identify changes in coverage over time, 
adjusting for time, geography, and income. We use the 2012-2013 period to control for 
geographic and income group differences that might be correlated with our outcomes of interest. 
Essentially, this allows us to do a difference-in-difference-in-difference (DDD) model across 
 
12 The last exemption was based on the lowest-cost bronze-level plan in each rating area. Healthcare.gov provides county-level bronze 
premium data for states on the federal exchange, which are not available in the data source we use for our silver-level premiums. Thus, for the 16 
states using state-based exchanges, we imputed the lowest-cost bronze premiums for each rating area using a regression model to predict the ratio 
of second-lowest-cost silver plan to lowest-cost bronze plan as a function of the following variables: number of silver plans, ratio of maximum to 
minimum silver premium, ratio of maximum to second-lowest silver premium, ratio of median to second-lowest silver premium, ratio of second-
lowest to minimum silver premium, and PUMA-level demographic measures from the ACS for age, sex, race, citizenship, education, disability, 
parental status, marital status, and household size. 
13 The mandate penalty is additionally capped at the national average premium for bronze-level health plans offered by the health insurance 
exchanges, and those with only short periods without insurance (less than 3 months per year) are also exempt from the fine. 
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PUMAs, income groups, and time. Our model also separately identifies the policy effects in 
2014 vs. 2015 since the policies themselves evolved over time. 
We have 8 policy parameters – two versions each (2014 and 2015) of the mandate 
penalty, new Medicaid eligibility based on state expansion decisions, and premium subsidy rate; 
and then single measures of pre-ACA Medicaid eligibility and early expansion eligibility (since 
neither policy changed between 2014 and 2015). We model the direct effects of these policies in 
all four years of the study (which includes 2 years of the pre-ACA baseline) and the DDD 
estimates by interacting each term with post-ACA year fixed effects: 
(1) %Uninsuredijt = β0 +β1 PercentSubsidy2014ij +β2 PercentSubsidy2015ij  
+ β3 MandatePenalty2014ij +β4 MandatePenalty2015ij+β5 McaidEligiblePreACAij  
+ β6 McaidEarlyExpansionEligibleij +β7 McaidNewlyEligible2014ij  
+ β8 McaidNewlyEligible2015ij  
+ β9 PercentSubsidy2014ij * Yr2014t  
+ β10 MandatePenalty2014ij* Yr2014t  
+ β11 McaidEligiblePreACAij* Yr2014t  
+ β12 McaidEarlyExpansionEligibleij * Yr2014t  
+ β13 McaidNewlyEligible2014ij * Yr2014t  
+ β14 PercentSubsidy2015ij * Yr2015t  
+ β15 MandatePenalty2015ij* Yr2015t  
+ β16 McaidEligiblePreACAij* Yr2015t  
+ β17 McaidEarlyExpansionEligibleij * Yr2015t  
+ β18 McaidNewlyEligible2015ij * Yr2015t  
+ Ω Area j*HIU_Typei + ∂ Yeart*HIU_Typei + µ Incomei*HIU_Typei  
+ π AreaUnemploymentRate jt + βx Xijt + εijt 
Subscript i indexes the family (HIU), which is the unit of observation; j indexes the 
geographical area; and t indexes time (year). The dependent variable is the percent of each HIU 
without insurance at the time of the survey; for single adults, this is a binary variable, for 
families with multiple members this is a continuous fraction ranging from 0 to 1. β1 through β8 
capture the baseline (pre-ACA) direct effects of the PUMA-income policy variables. The 
coefficients of interest are β9 through β13, which measure the impact of the ACA policy variables 
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in 2014, and β14 through β18, which measure the policy impacts in 2015.14  
 Ω is a vector of area fixed effects (either PUMA or state, depending on the model), ∂ is a 
vector of year fixed effects, and µ is a vector of fixed effects for different income groups; all 
three fixed effects were interacted with HIU type (single adults, adult couples, and families with 
children), since each group has its own coverage trends and policy responses. Xijt is a vector of 
the demographics based on the adult(s) in the family: race/ethnicity, marital status, citizenship, 
age, educational attainment, and number of children. Finally, the model adjusts for annual 
county-level unemployment rates from the Bureau of Labor Statistics. 
Even with the DDD model, Equation 1 raises several identification concerns. Primary 
among these is state- or PUMA-level differences in the income distribution that may be related 
to both premiums and Medicaid expansion, as well as omitted factors correlated with both family 
income and tastes for insurance. Another flaw is that the mapping of survey-reported income 
onto ACA-related eligibility is imprecise, creating measurement error biased towards the null.  
We address many of these concerns through the use of a “simulated” measure of 
eligibility (Currie & Gruber, 1996a, 1996b; Cutler & Gruber, 1996). For this measure, we first 
group all families into 12 income bands.15 For each income band, we randomly select from the 
national sample up to 200 families of each of three types – single adults, adult couples,16 and 
families with children – such that the total number of individuals sampled per group is 
approximately 200. We then assign this same sample to each PUMA in our dataset and estimate 
the value of our policy variables for that family type-PUMA-income group cell.  
 
14 A simpler alternative is to run two separate models: one for 2012-2014, and the other for 2012-2015 that omits 2014 as a washout period. The 
overall results of these separate models are essentially identical to the single model specified here. 
 
15 The income bands were: 0-50% FPL, 50-100% FPL, 100-138% FPL, 138-200% FPL, 200-250% FPL, 250-300% FPL, 300-350% FPL, 350-
400% FPL, 400-500% FPL, 500-600% FPL, 600-800% FPL, and greater than 800% FPL. Tweaking these to stagger them across the ACA’s key 
income thresholds (e.g., using 100-150% FPL and 350-450% FPL instead) produces similar results in our regression models. In all models, we 
recoded negative incomes as $0, and incomes above the 99th percentile were top-coded as the 99th percentile. 
16 This group contains families with 2 adults and no children 18 or younger. Approximately 99% of the HIUs in this group are married 
couples. The others are typically single parents with adult dependents (e.g. a 20 year-old student). 
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The resulting measure computes, for example, the average subsidy for a representative set 
of single adults from 150-200% of FPL, in each PUMA in the nation. Critically, this approach 
allows us to capture the variation in subsidies by income group and PUMA, but to also 
rigorously control for any direct influences of income and PUMA by putting in a full set of 12 
income category dummies and PUMA dummies. That is, the only variation that identifies this 
model is interactions of PUMA, income, and year, and not direct effects of any of these factors.17  
This approach mitigates several potential sources of bias. First, it eliminates any 
endogeneity based on state-level differences in income distributions. Some states have poorer 
populations or worsening economic conditions over time, which may affect premiums as well as 
the share of the population eligible for Medicaid; using a standardized population in all states 
removes any bias from this source. Second, this approach reduces concerns about the 
measurement of survey income, since we are longer reliant on precise family-level estimates of 
premium subsidies and other measures; instead, we use an aggregate measure of the ACA’s 
policy features for families within a given income band. Third, it reduces the potential for 
individual-level endogeneity of income in response to ACA policies. We assign families to fairly 
broad income bands using their actual income, but then use the simulated measure for the whole 
income band to assess policy impact. In other words, the model assumes that income group is not 
endogenous, even if a family’s specific income within that group may be. Fortunately, other 
work on the ACA suggests that employment responses to the law have been minimal on both the 
intensive and extensive margins (Gooptu et al., 2016; Kaestner et al., 2015; Moriya et al., 2016). 
These simulated policy measures can serve as instruments for each family’s actual 
premium subsidy, mandate penalty, and Medicaid eligibility as described in Equation 1. The 
 
17 Unlike the original Currie-Gruber approach, our model simulates eligibility at the PUMA rather than state-level. However, collapsing our 
simulated eligibility measure to a state-level estimate for each income band produces similar findings as our main model. 
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first-stage regression for such a 2SLS estimate is close to one for each policy measure (see 
Appendix Table 2), so that IV and reduced form estimation yield almost identical answers. Thus, 
for most analyses we focus on a reduced form model identical to Equation 1, except that for each 
of the policy variables and interaction terms (β1 through β18) we use simulated policy measures 
as the independent variables of interest. For brevity, we do not re-state this equation, but this and 
the full 2SLS equation are described in the Appendix. 
Our primary model focuses on the percentage of each HIU that is uninsured. In all 
models, we use ACS survey weights aggregated at the HIU-level and robust standard errors 
clustered at the level of the PUMA. 
 
V. Results 
A. Summary Statistics and Coverage Trends 
Table 1 presents summary statistics for our sample in 2014 and 2015. Nearly one-quarter 
of the population was Medicaid eligible before the ACA, 2% gained eligibility under the ACA’s 
early expansions, while approximately 5% became eligible in 2014. Overall, nearly two-thirds of 
the sample was subject to the mandate, and the size of the average mandate penalty more than 
doubled from 2014 to 2015 ($458 to $956). The mean unsubsidized premium was slightly more 
than $8000 in both years. The subsidy rate was approximately 16% in both 2014 and 2015. 
Table 2 shows the time series for insurance outcomes. There was a net decrease in the 
uninsured rate of roughly 3.4 percentage points in 2014 and 6.0 percentage points in 2015, both 
compared to the 2012-2013 period. By 2015, there had been a 3.3 percentage point increase in 
Medicaid, 0.9 percentage point increase in ESI, and 1.9 percentage point increase in non-group 
private coverage. Overall coverage gains were largest for single adults (10.8 percentage points 
by 2015), with smaller changes for couples (4.6) and families with children (4.2). 
  21 
B. IV and Reduced Form Model Results 
Table 3 shows the ACA-related coefficients for the 2SLS and reduced form approaches; 
coefficients for demographic covariates are in Appendix Table 1. Due to computational 
constraints when attempting to run the 2SLS model with the full set of PUMA fixed effects, we 
control for state rather than PUMA in the IV model. The estimates are virtually identical between 
the IV and reduced form models for each policy measure. For simplicity, we focus on the 
reduced form estimates for the remainder of the paper, which also enables us to consider a more 
robust set of PUMA-level fixed effects and various interaction terms as discussed below. 
We estimate a significant negative effect of the subsidy rate on the risk of being 
uninsured. The subsidy rate estimate shows that for each 1.0 percentage-point of subsidy, the 
uninsured rate fell by 0.051 percentage points in 2014. This effect was nearly twice as large in 
2015, with a coefficient of 0.089. Put another way, each 10% increase in average subsidy 
produced a decrease in the uninsured rate of 0.89 percentage points in 2015, equal to roughly 2.4 
million Americans (given 273 million non-elderly Americans). 
The coefficient on the mandate penalty is quite small in magnitude and presumably 
wrong-signed (i.e. higher mandate leads to more uninsured). The magnitude of the coefficient 
implies that each $100 in mandate in 2014 (when the average penalty was roughly $460) 
increases the uninsured rate by 0.04 percentage-points, which is negligible. The coefficient in 
2015 was similarly small – 0.03. This could be because individuals are not aware of the precise 
exemption parameters, or because they do not respond to the affordability exemption. It does not 
necessarily imply that the mandate had no effect, though it does suggest that individuals did not 
respond to their income-specific mandate. This still leaves open the possibility of a more general 
impact of a “taste for compliance” that some have hypothesized (Saltzman et al., 2015).  
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The coefficients on all three Medicaid eligibility variables are highly significant. The 
results indicate a marginal reduction in the uninsured rate of 8.9 percentage points in 2014 and 
13.7 percentage points in 2015 among individuals made newly for Medicaid. Take-up rates were 
even higher (10.7 and 19.7 points in 2014 and 2015, respectively) for those who became eligible 
under the ACA’s early Medicaid expansions. Meanwhile, we also detect smaller but significant 
insurance changes among those who were previously eligible for Medicaid. Our coefficient 
suggests that the ACA expansion led to 2.6 and 4.6 percentage-point increases in coverage in 
2014 and 2015, respectively, for those who were already eligible for Medicaid prior to the ACA 
– the so-called “woodwork effect.”  
Overall, our Medicaid findings build on prior analyses of the Medicaid expansion, which 
used standard difference-in-differences methods and several data sources to estimate 2014 
coverage gains ranging from 3 to 6 percentage points (Courtemanche et al., 2016; Kaestner et al., 
2015; Sommers, Gunja, et al., 2015). Importantly, those analyses did not attempt to model other 
aspects of the law simultaneously and did not disentangle the various types of Medicaid 
eligibility – they present estimates for overall take-up among the broad group of low-income 
adults.  One paper (Simon, Soni, & Cawley, 2016) that took an approach closer to our “newly-
eligible” estimate separately identified childless adults, who were the main group to become 
newly eligible; they found larger take-up rates on the order of 15 percentage points, closer to our 
newly-eligible coefficient.  
The next set of coefficients show the direct impact of our policy measures when not 
interacted with 2014 or 2015 – i.e., the impact in 2012-2013. Pre-existing and early expansion 
Medicaid eligibility are negatively associated with uninsurance as one would expect. It is 
somewhat surprising that there are significant coefficients on several other policy measures –
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though these point estimates are generally small. This suggests the possibility of omitted factors 
across PUMA-income cells that are correlated with both our policy measures and coverage. We 
can address this concern by further enriching the model to incorporate interactions of PUMA and 
income category, so that the identification purely comes from differences in effects within each 
PUMA-income category. We do so in Table 5, with minimal impact on the results.  
Figure 4 plots the ACA policy coefficients from the reduced form model for each year of 
our study as a visual test of our DDD approach. For clarity, we have separated the 2014 and 2015 
results. We find generally flat trend lines for 2012-2013 before large changes in 2014 and 2015 
for premium subsidies, new Medicaid eligibility, and previous Medicaid eligibility. For the early 
expansions, we see a slight downward trend in the uninsured coefficient from 2012-2013, 
consistent with the implementation of those expansions during that period, before a much larger 
drop occurred in 2014 and 2015. Meanwhile, the trend for the mandate penalty is essentially flat 
throughout the study period. This offers strong evidence that our model is capturing a 
discontinuous change in outcomes related to these policy measures in 2014 and 2015, rather than 
spurious variation in outcomes that predated the ACA’s implementation.  
C. Decomposing Coverage Changes by ACA Policy Provision 
In Table 4, we apply our estimates to model the population-level changes in insurance 
coverage in 2014 that are accounted for by these aspects of the ACA. Over the period from 2012-
2013 to 2014, the rate of uninsurance as measured by the ACS fell by 3.4 percentage points. We 
find that the average 16% subsidy to exchange coverage in the full sample implies a reduction in 
uninsurance of 0.83 percentage points. The estimates for the mandate are small (as well as 
inconsistent and non-significant in robustness checks we present below), so we ignore this in our 
calculations. We estimate that the 2014 Medicaid expansion to 4.5% of our sample reduced 
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uninsurance by 0.40 percentage points; the early expansions affected 2% of the sample and 
reduced uninsurance by 0.21 percentage points; and the “woodwork effect” – impacting 23% of 
our sample – led to a decline in uninsurance of 0.60 percentage points. Taken together, the policy 
variables in our model sum to nearly a 2.1 percentage-point reduction in the uninsured rate. Of 
this total, 41% is attributable to premium subsidies, 20% to the expansion of Medicaid eligibility 
in 2014, 10% the early expansion, and 29% to the woodwork effect. The relative magnitudes of 
the changes for each policy were quite similar in 2015. The prominence of the woodwork effect 
is due to the fact that nearly 5 times as many people (disproportionately children) were already 
eligible for Medicaid before the ACA than those made newly eligible in 2014. Our estimates are 
slightly more oriented towards Medicaid gains than previous estimates by Carman et al. (2015), 
but broadly consistent with their results, despite different analytical approaches and data sources.  
However, Carman and colleagues only assessed Medicaid and premium subsidies, without 
examining different types of Medicaid coverage gains, heterogeneity across state Marketplace 
type, or effects of the mandate penalty. 
Overall, our parameterization of the ACA explains approximately 60% of the 3.4 
percentage-point decrease observed in 2014 and a nearly equal fraction of the 6.0 percentage-
point change in 2015. Several other analyses have attributed nearly all of the national change in 
coverage in 2014 to the ACA, even after adjustment for the improving economy (Blumberg, 
Garrett, & Holahan, 2016; Sommers, Gunja, et al., 2015). In our model, the area unemployment 
rate is a significant predictor of coverage (with each percentage point drop in unemployment 
reducing the uninsured rate by 0.2 percentage points), but our ACA policy coefficients are nearly 
identical with or without this adjustment. Thus, the remaining decline in uninsurance in 2014-
2015 may be due to other unmeasured aspects of the ACA, such as the social effect of the 
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individual mandate, guaranteed issue requirements, simplification of purchasing coverage due to 
the creation of the exchanges, and any measurement error in our policy variables.  
D. Robustness Checks 
Table 5 considers the robustness of our estimates; for simplicity, we list only the 2015 
policy effects (the 2014 coefficients follow a similar pattern, but with smaller magnitudes). 
Column 1 shows the same reduced form model used in Table 3, but replaces state fixed effects 
with PUMA fixed effects. The results are nearly identical to the baseline model. Columns 2-4 
include various second-level interactions to test whether omitted variables may be driving the 
results. Column 2 allows for an interaction between PUMA and income categories. This allows 
us to drop the direct effects of our simulated policy variables (set at the PUMA-income level), 
and leaves only the policy interactions with Year2014 and Year2015. The results again are nearly 
identical. Column 3 allows for PUMA-income interactions and income-year fixed effects, to 
address possible time-varying differences in insurance trends across income groups unrelated to 
the ACA. This model reduced the point estimates somewhat though with the same basic pattern, 
except the mandate penalty becomes negative and non-significant. Column 4 tests PUMA-year 
interactions and income-year interactions, with generally similar estimates. We also consider 
replacing the Mandate Penalty variable with Any Mandate (i.e. percent of families that are not 
exempt from the mandate) or the mandate penalty as a percentage of income. These results 
(Columns 5 and 6) again demonstrate small and inconsistent impacts of the mandate. 
Finally, we consider an alternative premium subsidy measure. Column (7) replaces 
Percent Subsidy with Net Premium (in $1000s), which shows a significant positive effect of the 
premium on uninsurance – but the implied effect is much smaller than that captured by the 
percent subsidy in our main model. Applying this coefficient to the type of analysis shown in 
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Table 4, we estimate a change in uninsured in 2015 due to subsidies of just 0.73 percentage 
points, as opposed to the 1.53 percentage points from the percent subsidy. Column (8) shows that 
when both measures are included together, the coefficient for Percent Subsidy is unchanged from 
our primary model, while the coefficient for Net Premium is essentially zero. These results 
indicate that the percent subsidy – by capturing information on both price and the potential 
benefits of coverage – better reflects exchange consumer decision-making than the out-of-pocket 
premium alone. This suggests, for example, that older individuals or those in areas with more 
costly insurance are more likely to take up exchange coverage than younger individuals or those 
in cheaper rating areas, conditional on facing a similar net premium after subsidies.  
E. Results by Type of Insurance 
Next, we decompose our findings on uninsurance into changes among three types of 
coverage: Medicaid/government assistance plan, employer-sponsored insurance, and non-group 
private insurance (Table 6). As discussed earlier, the ACS survey wording makes it reasonable 
for respondents receiving subsidized exchange coverage to report either “Medicaid/government 
assistance plan for those with low incomes” or “insurance purchased directly from an insurance 
company.” The positive coefficient on percent subsidy in the “Medicaid/government assistance 
plan” regressions indeed suggests that some individuals report their publicly-subsidized 
exchange coverage in this way. This is consistent with evidence from the Census Bureau that 
some respondents in the ACS describe their private coverage using this option (Pascale et al., 
2016). 
Still, as expected, we find the largest effect of the premium subsidies on non-group 
insurance. We estimate that each 10% rise in subsidy increased the share of the population with 
non-group insurance by 0.48 percentage points by 2015. At the mean subsidy (16.2%) and 
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baseline non-group coverage rate (8.8%), this implies an elasticity of demand for non-group 
coverage of -0.09. If we treat the subsidy coefficients on Medicaid as part of the exchange effect, 
the elasticity is -0.17.  While lower than the elasticity used in typical microsimulation modeling 
of the ACA (Gruber, 2011), the 2015 estimate is nearly twice as large as the 2014 estimate, 
suggesting that increased awareness of the law and resolving technical challenges in the 
exchanges likely improved consumer responsiveness over time.  Our data source does not allow 
us to detect whether an individual has an “affordable” offer of employer coverage (defined by 
the ACA to be ≤ 9.5% of income), which precludes a person from receiving a premium subsidy. 
However, previous research suggests that only 1.1% of those who are uninsured or with 
individual coverage and potentially income-eligible for premium subsidies have an employer 
offer for coverage (Dorn & Buettgens, 2013).  Accounting for this omission and multiplying our 
elasticity by 1/.989 is within the rounding error on our overall estimate.   
The coefficient on the mandate penalty remains small, wrong-signed, and only 
statistically significant for non-group coverage. 
We estimate highly significant impacts of all three Medicaid variables on Medicaid 
coverage. These coefficients reflect marginal take-up rates among those eligible for the program. 
Strikingly, these Medicaid effects are very close to the effects for overall insurance coverage; 
that is, we estimate virtually no crowd-out of private coverage by the Medicaid expansion or 
woodwork effect. This is illustrated further in the next two columns of Table 6. We observe no 
negative impact of the Medicaid eligibility variables on either ESI or non-group insurance (and 
in fact detect a significant but small positive effect of pre-ACA eligibility on both, on the order 
of 0.5 to 0.8 percentage points). This is a notable finding, as most previous literature suggested at 
least some crowd-out was likely under the ACA.   
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At least one analysis of the ACA has detected moderate crowd-out – roughly 25% for 
parents, less for childless adults (Kaestner et al., 2015). However, this appears to be an artifact of 
modeling Medicaid eligibility alone. In the 100-138% income range, individuals in non-
expansion states are able to receive premium subsidies as a fallback to Medicaid. This increases 
private coverage in those states. In a simple differences-in-differences model with a simple 
binary Medicaid expansion vs. non-expansion independent variable, this larger increase in 
private coverage in non-expansion states appears as a form of “crowd-out” (i.e. a negative DD 
coefficient on private insurance – see Appendix Table 3). However, this is not crowd-out in the 
traditional sense: Medicaid is not leading some to drop private insurance coverage. Rather, in the 
absence of Medicaid expansion, some adults obtain premium subsidies. In our model, which 
explicitly accounts for both Medicaid and premium subsidies, we find no crowd-out at all.18  
One previous coverage expansion without much crowd-out occurred in Massachusetts, 
suggesting that the individual mandate may play an important role here (Hackmann, Kolstad and 
Kowalski 2014). In addition, Clemens (2015) showed that community rating in private insurance 
– as required by the ACA – may also reduce crowd-out from Medicaid.19 
 
F. Heterogeneity in Coverage Changes 
We examine patterns of ACA effects across different demographic groups and states 
(Table 7). To do so, we repeat our reduced form analysis for several stratified samples, based on 
family type (single adults, adult couples without children, and families with children) and state 
policies. We compared states that had established their own exchanges in 2014 (n=14) to those 
 
18 The simple D-in-D model also shows a reduction in ESI associated with Medicaid expansion. This effect also disappears in our full model, 
in which we do not simply analyze Medicaid expansion as a binary variable but take into account how many people actually gained eligibility.  
19 Table 6 also includes some counterintuitive results that are statistically significant but of such small magnitude as to be economically 
negligible.  For instance, the coefficient on “Previously Medicaid Eligible * 2015” for ESI is significantly positive.  However, the mean level of 
this independent variable is .227, which means that the coefficient in question relates to a predicted increase in ESI of 0.0018 – less than 2/10ths 
of a percentage point.  The statistical significance here most likely just reflects the very large sample size of the ACS.    
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using the federal exchange.20 We also compared states based on their ACA Medicaid policies, 
classified into three groups – non-expansion states (n=21); early (2011-2013) expansion states 
(n=6, including Washington DC); and states that expanded eligibility in 2014 or 2015 (n=24).  
Coverage gains associated with premium subsidies were significantly larger for adult 
couples (ß=-0.108) than single adults (ß=-0.085) or for families with children (ß=-0.070). The 
2015 effects of Medicaid eligibility were largest in for adult couples, with take-up rates of over 
18% for both previously-eligible and newly-eligible adults, compared to 5.1% and 11.7% for 
single adults. Among families with children, the woodwork effect was smaller – 4.1% – which 
likely reflects the fact that Medicaid/CHIP take-up rates for children were already quite high 
(Kenney et al., 2011). However, since children make up such a large portion of Medicaid 
eligibility, this is a non-trivial population effect. In children-only models, we estimate that they 
account for 28-45% of the overall population woodwork effect in 2015.21 
In our analysis by state policy, exchange subsidies were significantly more effective at 
reducing the uninsured rate in states with state-based exchanges than in states using the federal 
exchange. Conditional on the subsidy amount, gains in coverage were essentially twice as high in 
the state exchanges (ß=-0.129) as in the federal exchange (ß=-0.076). While technical difficulties 
plagued the launch of the federal website, several state exchanges were similarly affected, and 
these difficulties would not explain the differences we observe well into 2015. More likely is that 
states that implemented their own exchanges were more consistent supporters of coverage 
expansion, with greater outreach efforts and stronger application assistance programs (Shin, 
 
20 The 14 states with state-based exchanges were CA, CO, CT, DC, HI, ID, KY, MA, MD, MN, NY, RI, VT, and WA. For 2016, Hawaii has 
reverted to the federal exchange, and Kentucky will do so for 2017. 
21 This requires adapting our HIU-level model to run an individual-level analysis for children only. If we use the same simulated instruments 
as our main model for premium subsidies and the mandate, but substitute child-level Medicaid/CHIP eligibility for the three-part Medicaid 
eligibility modeled in Equation 1, we estimate that the uninsured rate among children eligible for Medicaid or CHIP fell by 1.0 percentage point 
in 2014 and 1.8 percentage points in 2015, with no significant private insurance crowd-out. At the population level, this accounts for 28% of the 
overall woodwork effect in Table 4 (given that 57% of children were already eligible), or equivalently, 800,000 additionally insured children in 
2015. An alternative model that includes only Medicaid/CHIP eligibility provides an upper bound of 1.4 million additionally insured children, 
which would represent roughly 45% of the woodwork effect. 
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Sharac, Zur, Alvarez, & Rosenbaum, 2014; Sommers, Maylone, Nguyen, Blendon, & Epstein, 
2015). However, our analysis here is merely suggestive and without a clear causal interpretation. 
The pattern by Medicaid expansion decision also showed significantly larger effects of 
exchange subsidies in states more supportive of the ACA (expansion states, particularly the early 
expansion states). This finding suggests that the early eligibility expansions from 2011-2013 laid 
the groundwork for increased Medicaid participation later on. Notably, we find large and 
similarly-sized woodwork effects in all groups of states, regardless of Medicaid expansion status. 
 
VI. Policy Implications and Conclusions 
In what we believe is the most comprehensive analysis to date of coverage changes under 
the ACA related to the law’s primary policy measures, we identify several notable findings. 
First, of the ACA’s reduction in the uninsured rate in 2014 and 2015 that is attributable to our 
policy measures, roughly 40% was due to the creation of premium subsidies for exchange 
coverage. The other 60% was due to increased Medicaid coverage – much of it the result of 
enrolling individuals eligible for Medicaid before 2014, including many children. While some 
policymakers and researchers had anticipated this potential “woodwork effect,” the fact that it is 
such a large policy lever is somewhat surprising, and simple differences-in-differences models of 
the Medicaid expansion obscure this important policy heterogeneity across eligibility groups.  
In part, our large woodwork estimate may reflect some measurement error in Medicaid 
eligibility, and if some share of our sample appeared eligible based on 2013 data but in fact was 
not eligible until 2014 or 2015, this could bias our findings towards a larger woodwork effect.22 
However, federal administrative data on Medicaid enrollment confirm that a substantial 
 
22 Of course, the converse is also possible – our approach may define some individuals as ineligible in 2013 even though they were eligible. 
But these two mismeasurement effects are likely to be asymmetric, since the marginal take-up rate in 2014 among newly-eligible individuals 
should (and does) exceed the marginal take-up rate among previously eligible individuals. Essentially, mismeasurement of pre-ACA Medicaid 
eligibility should bias the woodwork coefficient upwards and the newly-eligible coefficient downwards. 
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woodwork effect is evident, and this effect exists whether or not a state expanded Medicaid 
under the ACA. Even in non-expansion states, Medicaid enrollment by January 2015 had 
increased by 8% over pre-ACA levels. In expansion states, of course, it had increased even more 
– by 26% – but our results suggest that a sizable portion of the gains in these states was in fact 
from the woodwork effect (CMS, 2014). Moreover, even among the childless adult group that 
comprises the bulk of the newly-eligible population, as of late 2014 roughly 1/3 of this 
enrollment group was eligible under pre-ACA criteria (CMS, 2016).23 These findings are also 
consistent with enrollment spillovers detected in pre-ACA Medicaid expansions (Aizer & 
Grogger, 2003; Dubay & Kenney, 2003; Sonier et al., 2013), as well as one recent analysis of 
children’s coverage under the ACA (Kenney, Haley, Pan, Lynch, & Buettgens, 2016). 
Another key finding is the lack of private insurance crowd-out. We find no evidence of 
significant crowd-out of employer-sponsored coverage by the new premium subsidies, and no 
evidence of crowd-out of either employer coverage or non-group private coverage by the 
Medicaid expansion. These results have implications for the ACA’s efficiency and effects on 
social welfare, as expanding coverage without crowding out alternative sources of health 
insurance reduces the law’s total cost and potential deadweight loss (Gruber, 2008). 
In terms of premium subsidies, our findings offer some useful insights for policy and 
future research. We find that modeling the net premiums is a fairly weak approach to predicting 
enrollment behavior, with coverage gains much more responsive to the percent subsidy received. 
It also suggests that much of the recent attention to absolute premium rate increases may be less 
relevant than the subsidy rate received by most exchange customers. By necessity, our model 
only examined a single representative premium in each market – the second lowest cost silver 
 
23 Massachusetts, due to its 2006 health reform law, and New York and Arizona, due to their large 2002-2003 expansions of Medicaid under 
Section 1115 waivers, were the largest contributors to this group in the CMS statistics. 
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plan. Further research is needed into how consumers enrolling in exchange plans choose among 
their various options, in terms of the relative tradeoffs between overall subsidy rates, net 
premiums, and other plan features such as cost-sharing requirements and provider networks. 
We find small and inconsistent effects of the individual mandate in 2014 and 2015. In 
some models, the coefficient is wrong-signed, while in others it is in the expected direction, with 
varying levels of statistical significance. Overall, it is the least robust of our estimates, and in all 
models, the coefficients indicate minimal policy impact. In part, this may indicate a lack of 
consumer awareness about the intricacies of the tax penalty rules and exemptions. It may also 
reflect the low levels of the mandate penalty in the law’s early years, though we saw no increase 
in the mandate’s effect in 2015 even with steeper penalties. Finally, the mandate likely exerts a 
generalized effect that encourages people to obtain coverage in a way that is independent of its 
precise details and whether one is even subject to it. In Massachusetts, for instance, researchers 
have shown an increase in Medicaid participation among adults after the implementation of the 
mandate, even though most had incomes too low to make them subject to it (Sonier et al., 2013).  
One of our paper’s main contributions is its comprehensive framework for rigorous 
causal evaluation of the ACA’s effects. Given the intense interest in many outcomes from this 
wide-ranging law, including health care utilization, labor market outcomes, and health effects, 
our approach will likely be useful for many subsequent analyses of the law.  
However, the 2016 election results have cast significant doubt over the law’s future. 
There has been discussion of a full repeal, as well as more targeted changes such as repealing the 
individual mandate, shifting Medicaid to block grants, and scaling back or eliminating premium 
tax credits. Our findings offer insight into how each of these pieces of the law are interacting to 
produce coverage gains and how their repeal would likely do the opposite. Overall, we find that 
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the bulk of the coverage gains in 2014-2015 are directly attributable to expanded eligibility for 
subsidized insurance via exchanges and Medicaid. While we also detect large gains in coverage 
for previously-Medicaid eligible populations (including many children), the underlying 
mechanism for these gains in 2014-2015 is presumably a combination of the ACA’s other 
features, such as a streamlined application process, the elimination of Medicaid asset tests, the 
mandate, and expanded eligibility for parents that likely improved Medicaid take-up rates for 
children as well. It is therefore possible that much of these latter coverage gains would also 
unravel after a repeal of the ACA. Undoubtedly, how patterns of coverage evolve over time in 
this policy environment – and how they affect other domains of health care and the economy – 
will remain worthy of continued study. 
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FIGURE 1. ELIGIBILITY FOR MEDICAID/CHIP BY INCOME AND 
STATE MEDICAID EXPANSION STATUS 
Panel A: Children 
    
Panel B: Adults 
 
Notes: Top panel represents child eligibility and bottom panel represents adult eligibility. Dashed vertical line indicates 138% of the Federal 
Poverty Level (FPL). 
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FIGURE 2. EXCHANGE PERCENT SUBSIDY IN 2015 BY INCOME AND  
STATE MEDICAID EXPANSION STATUS 
 
 
Notes: Dashed vertical lines indicate 138% and 400% of the Federal Poverty Level (FPL). 
 
FIGURE 3. INDIVIDUAL MANDATE PENALTY IN 2015 BY INCOME AND  
STATE MEDICAID EXPANSION STATUS 
 
 
Notes: Dashed vertical lines indicate 138% and 400% of the Federal Poverty Level (FPL). 
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FIGURE 4. POLICY COEFFICIENTS BY YEAR 
  
Panel A: 2014 Policy Measures 
 
  
Panel B: 2015 Policy Measures 
 
Note: Estimates are the reduced-form coefficients for each policy measure’s direct effect in Equation (2), with the regression separately estimated 
for each year of the sample. Panel A shows results for the 2014 policy measures, and Panel B shows results for the 2015 policy measures. 
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TABLE 1 —SUMMARY STATISTICS OF SIMULATED POLICY VARIABLES IN 2014 & 2015 
  
 2014 2015 
Medicaid Eligibility 
  Percent Previously Eligiblea 23.0% 22.7% 
 
(31.9%) (31.7%) 
Percent Eligible Under ACA Early Expansion 2.0% 
(11.1%) 
1.9% 
(10.9%) 
Percent Newly Eligible in 2014 4.5% 5.5% 
 
(18.2%) (19.7%) 
Individual Mandate 
  Family Mandate Penalty $458 $956 
 
($632) ($1,210) 
Subject to Mandate Penalty 63.7% 64.5% 
 
(41.0%) (40.5%) 
Exchange Premiums 
  Unsubsidized Family Premium $8,023 $8,114 
 
($3,282) ($3,298) 
Net Subsidized Family Premium $6,631 $6,715 
 
($3,488) ($3,519) 
Percent Subsidy 16.2% 16.1% 
 
(24.4%) (24.3%) 
  
 
Notes: Table presents weighted means, with standard deviations in parentheses, for the population 0 to 64 years old. All measures are 
assessed at the level of the Health Insurance Unit and use ACS survey weights, excluding the state of Massachusetts. 
a Based on state eligibility criteria as of 2013. 
 
 
 
TABLE 2—TIME SERIES CHANGE IN INSURANCE OUTCOMES BY FAMILY TYPE (2012-2015) 
 
2012 2013 2014 2015  
Overall 
   
  
Uninsured 17.5% 17.3% 14.0% 11.4%  
Medicaid 18.3% 18.5% 20.0% 21.6%  
Employer Sponsored Insurance 58.4% 58.1% 58.7% 59.1%  
Non-group Private 8.9% 8.6% 9.7% 10.7%  
Single Adults 
   
  
Uninsured 31.2% 30.3% 24.6% 20.0%  
Medicaid 13.4% 13.7% 16.3% 18.7%  
Employer Sponsored Insurance 47.5% 47.8% 49.1% 50.3%  
Non-group Private 8.7% 8.6% 10.4% 11.8%  
Adult Couples 
   
  
Uninsured 11.7% 11.8% 9.0% 7.1%  
Medicaid 3.7% 3.9% 5.0% 5.8%  
Employer Sponsored Insurance 75.1% 74.6% 74.6% 74.8%  
Non-group Private 11.5% 11.4% 12.9% 13.8%  
Families with Children 
   
  
Uninsured 12.6% 12.5% 10.2% 8.3%  
Medicaid 24.3% 24.6% 25.8% 27.1%  
Employer Sponsored Insurance 59.1% 58.7% 59.1% 59.3%  
Non-group Private 8.3% 7.8% 8.6% 9.3%  
 
 
Notes: Table presents weighted means for the population 0 to 64 years old. All measures are assessed at the level of the Health 
Insurance Unit and use ACS survey weights, excluding the state of Massachusetts. 
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TABLE 3—REDUCED FORM AND IV ESTIMATES FOR ACA EFFECTS ON 
PERCENT UNINSURED 
 
(1) 2-Stage Least 
Squares (2) Reduced Form 
2014 Policy Interactions   
Family Percent Subsidy * 2014 -0.056*** -0.051*** 
 
(0.002) (0.002) 
Family Mandate Penalty * 2014 (in $100s) 0.0004*** 0.0004*** 
 
(0.0001) (0.0001) 
Previously Medicaid-Eligible * 2014 -0.027*** -0.026*** 
 
(0.002) (0.002) 
Early Expansion Medicaid-Eligible *2014 -0.107*** -0.107*** 
 (0.006) (0.006) 
Newly Medicaid-Eligible * 2014 -0.090*** -0.089*** 
 (0.004) (0.002) 
2015 Policy Interactions   
Family Percent Subsidy * 2015 -0.098*** -0.089*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) 
Family Mandate Penalty * 2015 (in $100s) 0.0004*** 0.0003*** 
 (0.0000) (0.0001) 
Previously Medicaid-Eligible * 2015 -0.046*** -0.046*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) 
Early Expansion Medicaid-Eligible *2015 -0.196*** -0.197*** 
 (0.007) (0.007) 
Newly Medicaid-Eligible * 2015 -0.142*** -0.137*** 
 (0.004) (0.003) 
Direct Effects   
Family Percent Subsidy2014  -0.009 -0.006 
 
(0.008) (0.007) 
Family Percent Subsidy2015 -0.004 -0.002 
 (0.008) (0.007) 
Family Mandate Penalty2014 (in $100s) -0.0000 -0.0001* 
 
(0.000) (0.000) 
Family Mandate Penalty2015 (in $100s) -0.00002*** -0.0000*** 
 (0.0000) (0.000) 
Previously Medicaid-Eligible -0.120*** -0.110*** 
 
(0.005) (0.004) 
Early Expansion Medicaid-Eligible -0.045*** -0.034*** 
 (0.007) (0.007) 
Newly Medicaid-Eligible2014 -0.019** -0.015* 
 
(0.008) (0.008) 
Newly Medicaid-Eligible2015 -0.012 -0.011 
 (0.008) (0.008) 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the PUMA level. Dependent variable was the percentage of each Health 
Insurance Unit without any health insurance. All variables are expressed at the level of the Health Insurance Unit (HIU) and use ACS 
survey weights, excluding the state of Massachusetts, for the population aged 0 to 64 years old. Models control for HIU type (single 
adult, couple, family with children); number of men and women in the family; number of children; educational attainment, age, and 
race/ethnicity of adults in the family; area-specific annual unemployment rates; and year, income group, and state fixed effects each 
interacted with HIU type. N=5,458,170. 
*** Significant at the 1 percent level. ** Significant at the 5 percent level. * Significant at the 10 percent level. 
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TABLE 4—PROJECTED TIME SERIES IMPACT OF ACA POLICY VARIABLES ON PERCENT UNINSURED  
 
 
Reduced Form 
Coefficient 
Population Mean 
(Simulated Measure) 
Implied Percentage 
Point Change Share of Total ACA-Related Change 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
2014 Effects     
Family Percent Subsidy * 2014 -0.051 0.162 -0.83% 41% 
Family Mandate Penalty * 2014 (in $100s) 0.0004 4.58 0.18% N/A 
Previously Medicaid-Eligible * 2014 -0.026 0.230 -0.60% 29% 
Early Expansion Medicaid-Eligible *2014 -0.107 0.020 -0.21% 10% 
Newly Medicaid-Eligible * 2014 -0.089 0.045 -0.40% 20% 
     
2015 Effects     
Family Percent Subsidy * 2015 -0.089 0.161 -1.43% 40% 
Family Mandate Penalty * 2015 (in $100s) 0.0003 9.56 0.29% N/A 
Previously Medicaid-Eligible * 2015 -0.046 0.227 -1.04% 29% 
Early Expansion Medicaid-Eligible *2015 -0.197 0.019 -0.37% 10% 
Newly Medicaid-Eligible * 2015 -0.137 0.055 -0.75% 21% 
   
 
Notes: Dependent variable was the percentage of each Health Insurance Unit without any health insurance. All variables are expressed at the level of the Health 
Insurance Unit (HIU) and use ACS survey weights, excluding the state of Massachusetts, for the population aged 0 to 64 years old. Models control for HIU type (single 
adult, couple, family with children); number of men and women in the family; number of children; educational attainment, age, and race/ethnicity of adults in the 
family; area-specific annual unemployment rates; and year and state fixed effects both interacted with HIU type. 
  
  44 
 
TABLE 5—ROBUSTNESS TO ALTERNATIVE SPECIFICATIONS FOR ACA EFFECTS ON PERCENT UNINSURED 
PREMIUM SUBSIDIES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Family Percent Subsidy * 2015 -0.091*** -0.093*** -0.050*** -0.045*** -0.099*** -0.095***   -0.091*** (0.002) (0.002) (0.005) (0.006) (0.002) (0.002)   (0.003) 
Family Net Subsidized Premium 
($1000s) * 2015 
            0.0052*** -0.00002 
            (0.0002) (0.0002) 
 
INDIVIDUAL MANDATE         
Family Mandate Penalty ($100s) * 2015  0.0003*** 0.0003*** -0.0001 0.0004*    0.0005*** 0.0003*** (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0002)    (0.0002) (0.0000) 
Subject to Mandate * 2015         0.011***      
         (0.002)      Family Mandate Penalty (Percent of 
Income) * 2015 
         -0.042   
         (0.053)   
 
MEDICAID ELIGIBILITY         
Previously Medicaid-Eligible * 2015 -0.045*** -0.046*** -0.020*** -0.027*** -0.043*** -0.053*** -0.028*** -0.045*** (0.002) (0.002) (0.005) (0.005) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Early Expansion Medicaid-Eligible * 
2015 
-0.196*** -0.197*** -0.159*** -0.104*** -0.194*** -0.193*** -0.179*** -0.196*** 
(0.007) (0.007) (0.008) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) 
Newly Medicaid-Eligible * 2015 -0.137*** -0.138*** -0.108*** -0.092*** -0.138*** -0.129*** -0.114*** -0.137*** 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.005) (0.005) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
FIXED EFFECTS (all interacted with HIU-Type)        
Year fixed effects  √ √ 
  
√ √ √ √ 
Income fixed effects √ 
   
√ √ √ √ 
PUMA fixed effects √ 
   
√ √ √ √ 
PUMA-income fixed effects 
 
√ √ 
    
 
Income-year fixed effects 
  
√ √ 
   
 
PUMA-year fixed effects 
   
√ 
   
 
         
Notes: PUMA=public use microdata area. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the PUMA level. Dependent variable was the percentage of each Health 
Insurance Unit without any health insurance. All variables are expressed at the level of the Health Insurance Unit (HIU) and use ACS survey weights, excluding the 
state of Massachusetts, for the population aged 0 to 64 years old. Models control for HIU type (single adult, couple, family with children); number of men and women 
in the family; number of children; educational attainment, age, and race/ethnicity of adults in the family; and area-specific annual unemployment rates. All fixed effects 
are interacted with HIU type. All coefficients refer to 2015 policy estimates. 
*** Significant at the 1 percent level. ** Significant at the 5 percent level. * Significant at the 10 percent level. 
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TABLE 6—ACA POLICY EFFECTS IN 2015 BY TYPE OF COVERAGE 
 
(1) Uninsured (2) Medicaid or “government 
assistance plan”  
for low-income families 
(3) Employer 
Sponsored 
(4) Non-group 
Private 
Family Percent Subsidy * 2015 -0.091*** 0.040*** 0.011*** 0.048*** 
 
(0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) 
Family Mandate Penalty * 2015 ($100s) 0.0003*** -0.0001 -0.00004 -0.0003*** 
 
(0.0001) (0.00003) (0.0001) (0.0001) 
Previously Medicaid-Eligible * 2015 -0.045*** 0.038*** 0.008*** 0.005** 
 
(0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) 
Early Expansion Medicaid-Eligible * 2015 -0.196*** 0.210*** -0.000 -0.001 
 (0.007) (0.007) (0.005) (0.004) 
Newly Medicaid-Eligible * 2015 -0.137*** 0.148*** 0.002 0.002 
 
(0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.002) 
     
Notes: Regressions in table include fixed effects from Model 1 described in Table 5. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the PUMA level. Dependent variable 
was the percentage of each Health Insurance Unit without any health insurance. All variables are expressed at the level of the Health Insurance Unit (HIU) and use ACS 
survey weights, excluding the state of Massachusetts, for the population aged 0 to 64 years old. Models control for HIU type (single adult, couple, family with 
children); number of men and women in the family; number of children; educational attainment, age, and race/ethnicity of adults in the family; area-specific annual 
unemployment rates; and year, income group, and PUMA fixed effects each interacted with HIU type. All coefficients refer to 2015 policy estimates. 
*** Significant at the 1 percent level. ** Significant at the 5 percent level. * Significant at the 10 percent level. 
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TABLE 7—UNINSURED RESULTS BY FAMILY TYPE, EXCHANGE TYPE, AND MEDICAID EXPANSION STATUS 
 
Number of 
Observations 
Family Percent 
Subsidy * 2015 
Family Mandate 
Penalty * 2015 
($100s) 
Previously 
Medicaid-
Eligible * 2015 
Early Expansion 
Medicaid-Eligible * 
2015 
Newly Medicaid-
Eligible * 2015 
Family Type       Single Adults 2,594,364 -0.085*** 0.0028*** -0.051*** -0.155*** -0.117*** 
  
(0.004) (0.0002) (0.006) (0.007) (0.004) 
Adult Couples 990,805 -0.108*** 0.0006*** -0.187*** -0.258*** -0.187*** 
  
(0.004) (0.0001) (0.016) (0.020) (0.009) 
Families with Children 1,873,001 -0.070*** 0.0001*** -0.041*** -0.268*** -0.126*** 
  
(0.004) (0.00004) (0.002) (0.016) (0.009) 
Exchange Type       
  State-Based 1,706,327 -0.129*** 0.0002*** -0.046*** -0.203*** -0.162*** 
  (0.004) (0.00005) (0.003) (0.007) (0.006) 
  Federal 3,751,843 -0.076*** 0.0004*** -0.044*** -0.137*** -0.129*** 
  (0.003) (0.00004) (0.003) (0.002) (0.004) 
Medicaid Expansion Status       
  No Expansion 2,197,199 -0.064*** 0.0005*** -0.042*** N/A N/A 
  (0.003) (0.0001) (0.004)   
  Early Expansion in 2011-2013 1,130,446 -0.166*** 0.0003*** -0.057*** -0.200*** -0.164*** 
  (0.005) (0.0001) (0.004) (0.007) (0.007) 
 Expansion in 2014 or 2015 2,130,525 -0.099*** 0.0001** -0.045*** N/A -0.146*** 
  (0.003) (0.00005) (0.003)  (0.004) 
       
Notes: Regressions in table include fixed effects from Model 1 described in Table 5. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the PUMA level. Dependent 
variable was the percentage of each Health Insurance Unit without any health insurance. All variables are expressed at the level of the Health Insurance Unit and use 
ACS survey weights, excluding the state of Massachusetts, for the population aged 0 to 64 years old. Models control for family type (single adult, couple, family with 
children); number of men and women in the family; number of children; educational attainment, age, and race/ethnicity of adults in the family; and area-specific annual 
unemployment rates. All coefficients refer to 2015 policy estimates. 
*** Significant at the 1 percent level. ** Significant at the 5 percent level. * Significant at the 10 percent level. 
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For Online Publication: Appendix 
2-Stage Least Squares Regression Equation: 
 
1st Stage:  
Endogenous Variables (HIU-level observed policy measures) 
PercentSubsidy2014ij  
PercentSubsidy2015ij  
MandatePenalty2014ij 
MandatePenalty2015ij 
McaidEligiblePreACAij  
McaidEarlyExpansionEligibleij  
McaidNewlyEligible2014ij  
McaidNewlyEligible2015ij  
  
PercentSubsidy2014ij * Yr2014t  
MandatePenalty2014ij* Yr2014t  
McaidEligiblePreACAij* Yr2014t  
McaidEarlyExpansionEligibleij * Yr2014t  
McaidNewlyEligible2014ij * Yr2014t  
  
PercentSubsidy2015ij * Yr2015t  
MandatePenalty2015ij* Yr2015t  
McaidEligiblePreACAij* Yr2015t  
McaidEarlyExpansionEligibleij * Yr2015t  
McaidNewlyEligible2015ij * Yr2015t  
 
Instrumental Variables (simulated measures designated with the prefix “SIM” for each 
PUMA-income band combination): 
  
SIMPercentSubsidy2014ij  
SIMPercentSubsidy2015ij  
SIMMandatePenalty2014ij  
SIMMandatePenalty2015ij 
SIMMcaidEligiblePreACAij  
SIMMcaidEarlyExpansionEligibleij  
SIMMcaidNewlyEligible2014ij  
SIMMcaidNewlyEligible2015ij  
  
SIMPercentSubsidy2014ij*Yr2014t  
SIMMandatePenalty2014ij* Yr2014t  
SIMMcaidEligiblePreACAij* Yr2014t  
SIMMcaidEarlyExpansionEligibleij * Yr2014t  
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SIMMcaidNewlyEligible2014ij * Yr2014t  
  
SIMPercentSubsidy2015ij * Yr2015t  
SIMMandatePenalty2015ij* Yr2015t  
SIMMcaidEligiblePreACAij* Yr2015t  
SIMMcaidEarlyExpansionEligibleij * Yr2015t  
SIMMcaidNewlyEligible2015ij * Yr2015t  
  
Additional Independent Variables 
Ω Area j*HIU_Typei  
∂ Yeart*HIU_Typei  
µ Incomei*HIU_Typei  
π AreaUnemploymentRate jt  
βx Xijt  
 
2nd Stage: %Uninsuredijt = β0 +β1 PercentSubsidy2014ij +β2 PercentSubsidy2015ij  
+β3 MandatePenalty2014ij +β4 MandatePenalty2015ij+β5 McaidEligiblePreACAij  
+β6 McaidEarlyExpansionEligibleij +β7 McaidNewlyEligible2014ij  
+β8 McaidNewlyEligible2015ij  
  
+β9 PercentSubsidy2014ij * Yr2014t  
+β10 MandatePenalty2014ij* Yr2014t  
+β11 McaidEligiblePreACAij* Yr2014t  
+β12 McaidEarlyExpansionEligibleij * Yr2014t  
+β13 McaidNewlyEligible2014ij * Yr2014t  
  
+β14 PercentSubsidy2015ij * Yr2015t  
+β15 MandatePenalty2015ij* Yr2015t  
+β16 McaidEligiblePreACAij* Yr2015t  
+β17 McaidEarlyExpansionEligibleij * Yr2015t  
+β18 McaidNewlyEligible2015ij * Yr2015t  
  
+ Ω Area j*HIU_Typei + ∂ Yeart*HIU_Typei + µ Incomei*HIU_Typei  
+ π AreaUnemploymentRate jt + βx Xijt + εijt 
where i indexes the family (HIU), j indexes the geographical area, and t indexes time 
(year). The dependent variable is the percent of each HIU without insurance at the time of 
the survey; for single adults, this is a binary variable, for families with multiple members 
this is a continuous fraction ranging from 0 to 1. β1 through β8 capture the baseline (pre-
ACA) direct effects of the puma-income policy variables. The coefficients of interest are 
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β9 through β13, which measure the impact of the ACA policy variables in 2014, and β14 
through β18, which measure the policy impacts in 2015.  
 
Ω is a vector of area fixed effects (either PUMA level or state level, depending on the 
model), ∂ is a vector of year fixed effects, and µ is a vector of fixed effects for different 
income groups; all three fixed effects were interacted with HIU type (single adults, adult 
couples, and families with children), since each group likely has its own coverage trends 
and policy responses. Xijt is a vector of the demographics based on the adult(s) in the 
family: race/ethnicity, marital status, citizenship, age, educational attainment, and number 
of children. Finally, the model adjusts for annual county-level unemployment rates from 
the Bureau of Labor Statistics.  
 
 
Reduced Form Regression Equation (Modified from Equation 1 in Text): 
%Uninsuredijt = β0 +β1 SIMPercentSubsidy2014ij +β2 SIMPercentSubsidy2015ij  
+β3 SIMMandatePenalty2014ij +β4 SIMMandatePenalty2015ij 
+β5 SIMMcaidEligiblePreACAij +β6 SIMMcaidEarlyExpansionEligibleij  
+β7 SIMMcaidNewlyEligible2014ij +β8 SIMMcaidNewlyEligible2015ij  
  
+β9 SIMPercentSubsidy2014ij*Yr2014t  
+β10 SIMMandatePenalty2014ij* Yr2014t  
+β11 SIMMcaidEligiblePreACAij* Yr2014t  
+β12 SIMMcaidEarlyExpansionEligibleij * Yr2014t  
+β13 SIMMcaidNewlyEligible2014ij * Yr2014t  
  
+β14 SIMPercentSubsidy2015ij * Yr2015t  
+β15 SIMMandatePenalty2015ij* Yr2015t  
+β16 SIMMcaidEligiblePreACAij* Yr2015t  
+β17 SIMMcaidEarlyExpansionEligibleij * Yr2015t  
+β18 SIMMcaidNewlyEligible2015ij * Yr2015t  
  
+ Ω Area j*HIU_Typei + ∂ Yeart*HIU_Typei + µ Incomei*HIU_Typei  
+ π AreaUnemploymentRate jt + βx Xijt + εijt 
All variables are defined as in Equation 1, except that the policy variables associated with 
coefficients β1 through β18 are all simulated measures (designated with the prefix “SIM”) 
for each PUMA-income band combination. 
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APPENDIX FIGURE 1—PERCENTAGE OF FAMILIES SUBJECT TO INDIVIDUAL MANDATE 
PENALTY IN 2015, BY INCOME AND STATE MEDICAID EXPANSION STATUS 
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APPENDIX TABLE 1—REDUCED FORM ESTIMATES FOR PERCENT UNINSURED WITH 
DEMOGRAPHIC COVARIATES 
 
Reduced Form – Table 3 Results 
2014 Policy Interactions  
Family Percent Subsidy * 2014 -0.051*** 
 (0.002) 
Family Mandate Penalty * 2014 (in $100s) 0.0004*** 
 (0.0001) 
Previously Medicaid-Eligible * 2014 -0.026*** 
 (0.002) 
Early Expansion-Eligible *2014 -0.107*** 
 (0.006) 
Newly Medicaid-Eligible * 2014 -0.089*** 
 (0.002) 
2015 Policy Interactions  
Family Percent Subsidy * 2015 -0.089*** 
 (0.002) 
Family Mandate Penalty * 2015 (in $100s) 0.0003*** 
 (0.0001) 
Previously Medicaid-Eligible * 2015 -0.046*** 
 (0.002) 
Early Expansion-Eligible *2015 -0.197*** 
 (0.007) 
Newly Medicaid-Eligible * 2015 -0.137*** 
 (0.003) 
Direct Effects  
Family Percent Subsidy2014  -0.006 
 (0.007) 
Family Percent Subsidy2015 -0.002 
 (0.007) 
Family Mandate Penalty2014 (in $100s) -0.000* 
 (0.000) 
Family Mandate Penalty2015 (in $100s) -0.0000*** 
 (0.000) 
Previously Medicaid-Eligible -0.110*** 
 (0.004) 
Early Expansion Eligible -0.034*** 
 (0.007) 
Newly Medicaid-Eligible2014 -0.015* 
 (0.008) 
Newly Medicaid-Eligible2015 -0.011 
 (0.008) 
Other Covariates  
Area Unemployment Rate 0.002*** 
 (0.000) 
Number of Adult Females 0.011*** 
 
(0.002) 
Number of Adult Males 0.047*** 
 
(0.003) 
Number of Children = 0   
 
  
Number of Children = 1 -0.306*** 
 
(0.014) 
Number of Children = 2 -0.334*** 
 
(0.014) 
Number of Children = 3 -0.354*** 
 
(0.014) 
Number of Children = 4 -0.372*** 
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(0.014) 
Number of Children = 5 plus -0.368*** 
 
(0.014) 
Family has Head of Household 1 -0.054*** 
 
(0.003) 
HoH1 Non-citizen 0.085*** 
 
(0.002) 
HoH1 Age = Under 25 -0.018*** 
 
(0.003) 
HoH1 Age = 25-34 -0.005** 
 
(0.002) 
HoH1 Age = 35-44 0.010*** 
 
(0.002) 
HoH1 Age = 45-54 0.015*** 
 
(0.002) 
HoH1 Age = 55-64 -0.012*** 
 
(0.002) 
HoH1 Age = 65 and above   
 
  
HoH1 Race/Ethnicity = White -0.020*** 
 
(0.001) 
HoH1 Race/Ethnicity = Black -0.029*** 
 
(0.001) 
HoH1 Race/Ethnicity = Asian -0.020*** 
 
(0.002) 
HoH1 Race/Ethnicity = Native American 0.024*** 
 
(0.004) 
HoH1 Race/Ethnicity = Other Non-Hispanic -0.019*** 
 
(0.002) 
HoH1 Race/Ethnicity = Hispanic   
 
  
HoH1 Education = Less than High School 0.052*** 
 
(0.002) 
HoH1 Education = High School Diploma 0.021*** 
 
(0.001) 
HoH1 Education = College Graduate   
 
  
Family has Head of Household 2 -0.024*** 
 
(0.004) 
HoH2 Non-citizen 0.103*** 
 
(0.002) 
HoH2 Age = Under 25 -0.020*** 
 
(0.002) 
HoH2 Age = 25-34 0.034*** 
 
(0.001) 
HoH2 Age = 35-44 0.027*** 
 
(0.001) 
HoH2 Age = 45-54 0.013*** 
 
(0.001) 
HoH2 Age = 55-64 -0.012*** 
 
(0.001) 
HoH2 Age = 65 and above   
 
  
HoH2 Race/Ethnicity = White -0.040*** 
 
(0.001) 
HoH2 Race/Ethnicity = Black -0.034*** 
 
(0.002) 
HoH2 Race/Ethnicity = Asian -0.060*** 
 
(0.002) 
HoH2 Race/Ethnicity = Native American 0.006 
 
(0.004) 
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HoH2 Race/Ethnicity = Other Non-Hispanic -0.045*** 
 
(0.002) 
HoH2 Race/Ethnicity = Hispanic   
 
  
HoH2 Education = Less than High School 0.087*** 
 
(0.002) 
HoH2 Education = High School Diploma 0.030*** 
 
(0.001) 
HoH2 Education = College Graduate   
  
 
 
Notes: HoH=head of household, defined as the one or two adults in each household. Standard errors in parentheses. 
*** Significant at the 1 percent level.  
** Significant at the 5 percent level. 
* Significant at the 10 percent level. 
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APPENDIX TABLE 2—POLICY COEFFICIENTS FROM FIRST STAGE OF 2SLS REGRESSIONS 
Dep Var 
in 1st Stage†  
1st Stage Coefficients on Policy Variables† 
β1 β2 β3 β4 β5 β6 β7 β8 β9 β10 β11 β12 β13 β14 β15 β16 β17 β18 
β1 .974# .003^ 7.4* 24.2# -.016# .001 -.056# .006 .001 .032# -.007# -.001* -.006# .000 -.014 -.005* -.001 .002 
β2 .013# .984# 6.1 -6.1 .017# -.001* -.026# -.088# .001 -.019 .006# .000 -.008# .003# .115# .004* .000 -.017# 
β3 .000* .000 .945# 0.1# .000* .000* .000# .000# .000* .000* .000 .000^ .000# .000 .000# .000^ .000# .000* 
β4 .000^ .000# 0.0 .869# .000 .000 .000 .000 .000^ .000 .000 .000 .000 .000# .000# .000 .000 .000# 
β5 -.003# -.003# -6.2 -8.5 .963# .004# -.050# -.052# .003# -.008 -.006# .000 -.015# .003# .115# -.006# .000 -.015# 
β6 -.001 .000 -1.8 0.3 -.064# 1.03# -.057# -.056# .000 -.006 -.005# .000 -.010# .000 .032* -.006# .001# -.010# 
β7 -.006# -.006# 4.5 -10.4 -.025# .001 .934# .024# -.002* .037# -.010# .000 -.005# -.001 -.055* -.008# .000 .008# 
β8 .005# .006# 1.6 16.8# .023# -.002# -.012^ .899# .002# -.011 .006# -.001# -.004^ .001 .160# .003^ .000 -.017# 
β9 -.008# -.008# -21.0# -50.4# .000 .000 .000 .001 .970# -.120# .004# -.001* -.024# .000 -.023# .001# .000 -.001# 
β10 .000# .000# 2.2# 3.2# .000* .000 .000 .000 .000# .993# .000# .000# -.001# .000# -.003# .000# .000 .000 
β11 .007# .007# -15.4# -37.2# .001 .000 -.001 -.001 -.012# -.127# .986# .004# .008# .000 -.035# .000* .000 .000* 
β12 .003# .003# -8.6# -13.9# .004 .005 -.011# -.011# .000 -.043# -.040# 1.04# -.026# .000* -.008^ .001# .000^ -.001# 
β13 .002# .002# -10.0# -17.4# .003 .001* -.004* -.005* -.001# -.106# .015# .000 .958# .000 -.013# .002# .000 -.002# 
β14 -.016# -.015# -44.2# -103.5# .001 .000 .001* .001* .000* .004 -.001# .000# .000# .963# -.798# .008# -.001^ -.022# 
β15 .000# .000# 1.9# 2.7# .000 .000 .000# .000# .000^ .000# .000^ .000 .000# .000# 1.00# .000 .000# .000# 
β16 .012# .012# -34.6# -81.3# .003# .000 -.001* -.002* .000^ .009# .000^ .000 .000 -.007# -.867# .989# .004# .007# 
β17 .004# .004# -15.6# -25.5# .013# -.008* -.004* -.004* .000# .000 .000# .000# -.001# .003# -.184# -.029# 1.02# -.016# 
β18 .003# .003# -21.1# -35.1# .003 .000 -.001 -.003 .000 .001 -.002# .000 -.002# .001# -.462# .022# -.002# .959# 
Notes: HoH=head of household, defined as the one or two adults in each household. Standard errors in parentheses. 
# Significant at the 1 percent level.  
* Significant at the 5 percent level. 
^ Significant at the 10 percent level. 
† All ß coefficients refer to the policy variables in the 2SLS Equation in Appendix Methods.  
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APPENDIX TABLE 3—SIMPLE DIFFERENCE-IN-DIFFERENCES MODEL OF MEDICAID EXPANSION 
 
 
(1) Uninsured (2) Medicaid (3) Employer Sponsored (4) Non-group Private 
     
All Individuals 0-64 –  
Models Include Mandate and Premium Subsidy 
  
    
Medicaid Expansion in 2014 -0.013*** 0.024*** -0.006*** -0.005*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) Medicaid Expansion in 2015 -0.019*** 0.045*** -0.013*** -0.009*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001)  
All Individuals 0-64 –  
No Mandate and Premium Subsidy Variables  
 
    
Medicaid Expansion in 2014 -0.010*** 0.024*** -0.006*** -0.007*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Medicaid Expansion in 2015 -0.013*** 0.043*** -0.013*** -0.009*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)      
Low-Income Individuals 0-64 (0-138% FPL) – 
No Mandate and Premium Subsidy Variables  
     
Medicaid Expansion in 2014 -0.027*** 0.048*** -0.009*** -0.011*** 
 (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.001) 
Medicaid Expansion in 2015 -0.043*** 0.088*** -0.021*** -0.021*** 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) 
     
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the PUMA level. Dependent variable was the percentage of each Health Insurance Unit without any health 
insurance. All variables are expressed at the level of the Health Insurance Unit (HIU) and use ACS survey weights, excluding the state of Massachusetts, for the 
population aged 0 to 64 years old. Models control for number of men and women in the family; number of children; educational attainment, age, and race/ethnicity of 
adults in the family; area-specific annual unemployment rates; and year, income group, and state fixed effects each interacted with HIU type. Medicaid Expansion is a 
binary indicator for whether the state had expanded Medicaid under the ACA by that year; no other Medicaid eligibility variables are included in this model. 
*** Significant at the 1 percent level. ** Significant at the 5 percent level. * Significant at the 10 percent level. 
 
